Abstract. Password-based Authenticated Key-Exchange (PAKE) protocols allow the establishment of secure communication entirely based on the knowledge of a shared password. Over the last two decades, we have witnessed the debut of a number of prominent security models for PAKE protocols, whose aim is to capture the desired security properties that such protocols must satisfy when executed in the presence of an active adversary. These models are usually classified into i) indistinguishability-based (IND-based) or ii) simulation-based (SIMbased). However, the relation between these two security notions is unclear and mentioned as a gap in the literature. In this work, we prove that SIM-BMP security from Boyko et al. (EUROCRYPT 2000) implies IND-RoR security from Abdalla et al. (PKC 2005) and that IND-RoR security is equivalent to a slightly modified version of SIM-BMP security. We also investigate whether IND-RoR security implies (unmodified) SIM-BMP security. The results obtained also hold when forward secrecy is incorporated into the security models in question.
Introduction
The Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) problem asks for two entities, who only share a password, to engage in a conversation so that they agree on a session key. The established session key can be used to protect their subsequent communication. PAKE protocols play a key role in today's world as they allow for authenticated key exchange to occur without the use of Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI), by using a human-memorable password instead. Theoretically, they are fascinating, because of their ability to use a weak secret -such as a password or a pin -to produce a strong cryptographic key in a provably secure way over a hostile communications network. The nature of passwords makes PAKE protocols vulnerable to dictionary attacks. In such attacks, an adversary tries to break the security of the protocol by exhaustively enumerating all possible passwords until a guess is correct. This strategy might not be very successful on AKE schemes where the legitimate entities share a high-entropy key as long-term secret. However, in the PAKE setting the longterm secrets come from a small set of values, i.e. a dictionary, posing a genuine security threat.
We distinguish between two types of possible dictionary attacks: offline and online dictionary attacks. In an offline dictionary attack, the adversary uses interaction with the honest parties -or mere eavesdropping -to get information about the password that allows him to launch an exhaustive offline search. In an online dictionary attack, an attacker takes a password from the set of possible passwords, interacts with a legitimate party by running the protocol and checks whether the key exchange succeeds for the candidate password or not.
The cryptographic goal when designing PAKE protocols is to ensure that the attacker essentially cannot do better than an online dictionary attack. This goal recognizes that while online dictionary attacks cannot be avoided, offline dictionary attacks can and should be prevented. Numerous PAKE protocols have been designed to meet this goal but have later been found to be flawed [1] [2] [3] . Consequently, security models for PAKE have been devised to get assurance on the claimed security properties by performing a rigorous analysis.
In this work, we consider the provable security approach, where protocols are analyzed in a complexity-theoretic security model: the goal being that no reasonable algorithm can violate security under various hardness assumptions. The complexity-theoretic security models are classified into indistinguishability-based (IND-based) and simulation-based (SIM-based). In the IND-based approach security means that no probabilistic polynomial-time (PTT) adversary can distinguish an established session key sk from a random string, i.e. it guarantees semantic security on sk. The SIM-based approach defines two worlds: an ideal world which is secure by definition and the real world which is the real protocol execution against some PPT attacker. In the SIM-based setting, security asks for the indistinguishability between the ideal world and real world executions.
When dealing with formal security modeling of PAKE, the difference between the two previously mentioned approaches, IND and SIM, has practical consequences. It is accepted that IND-based models are easier to work with for protocol designers that wish to prove the security of their protocols. In fact, currently, most of the security proofs for PAKEs are constructed under the IND-based models Find-then-Guess (IND-FtG) from [4] and Real-or-Random (IND-RoR) 1 from [5] . In contrast, constructing security proofs in SIM-based models is considered more challenging. Two SIM-based models for PAKE that have seen wider use are Boyko, MacKenzie and Patel's (BMP) model [6] that is derived from Shoup's SIM-based model for AKE [7] and the Universal Composability (UC) framework of Canetti et al. [8] that follows the UC paradigm of Canetti [9] . While complex for constructing proofs of security, it is fair to recognize that SIM-based security i) offers a more intuitive and natural approach to defining security, ii) it is simpler to describe and interpret the security properties captured by the model, iii) SIM-secure protocols are well suited to accommodate secure composition results, and iv) it is possible to prove security of PAKE protocols even in the case of correlated passwords that may come from arbitrary password distributions. security notions for PAKE. 2 As we can see in Figure 1 , the only existing result that is known to hold between IND and SIM based definitions is the one from [8] . There, the authors show that their SIM-UC definition implies the IND-FtG definition from [4] . In practical terms, the lack of comparison results between IND-based and SIMbased models for PAKEs means that the security of PAKE protocols, such as SPEKE, 3 that have been studied in the SIM-BMP simulation model of [6] can not be compared with other PAKE protocols that are secure according to the SIM-UC or IND definitions. Forward Secrecy. Commonly referred as Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS), it is a security property for Authenticated Key-Exchange (AKE) and PAKE protocols. Roughly speaking, it ensures the protection of session keys -negotiated between two honest participants -even if the underlying long-term secret material (passwords for PAKEs) later gets compromised [15] . It is a highly desirable security property specially for PAKEs as unfortunately, there exist in real life different ways in which the adversary could obtain such password information e.g. via phishing attacks a cheated client could reveal his password to some malicious entity or the data base storing the client's password at the server could get compromised resulting in massive password leakage [16] [17] [18] . Therefore, it has been explicitly a design goal in relevant PAKEs [19, 20] . The intuition of forward secrecy was first mentioned by Diffie et al. in [15] . It was later formalized and incorporated in AKE [7, [21] [22] [23] and PAKE [4, 24] security models. It is indisputable that this formalization enhanced the understanding of forward secrecy by identifying distinct means in which a principal can get compromised and the information revealed to the adversary in such a case. However, it produced a number of definitions and variations on forward secrecy which might make it difficult to tell under which circumstances protocol "P" is fs-secure. For example, just in [4] the authors provide three different definitions for forward secrecy.
Our Contribution
In this work our contributions can be summarized as follows:
-We first reconcile the syntactic differences between the IND-RoR and SIM-BMP models for PAKE thus allowing honest comparison between them. More specifically, we slightly modify the initialization procedure of the INDRoR model [5] such that it follows the SIM-BMP model. -We incorporate forward secrecy into the SIM-BMP and IND-RoR security models. We consider only the weak corruption model as defined in [4] , which is the most used type of forward secrecy. -We prove that SIM-BMP security implies IND-RoR security and that INDRoR security is equivalent to a slightly modified version of SIM-BMP security adapted to the model of [25] . We also investigate whether IND-RoR security implies (unmodified) SIM-BMP security. -The results in this paper are based on the earlier conference paper [10] . Here, we extend the results obtained earlier and show that they also hold when forward secrecy in the weak corruption model is incorporated into the security models in question.
Related Work
Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE). The complexity theoretic treatment of security for AKE protocols was initiated by Bellare and Rogaway in 1993 [26] .
In their groundbreaking work, they followed the indistinguishability (IND) approach to formalize the notion of security for AKE protocols, using previously established symmetric keys as long-term secrets and considering the realistic scenario of concurrent sessions running on a network under full control of the adversary. In their model, an AKE protocol is secure if, under the allowed adversary actions, the established session key is computationally indistinguishable from a random string. After this initial work, numerous others have appeared studying the cryptographic security for AKE protocols following the IND-based approach [22, 21, [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] . In parallel, the first simulation (SIM) definition for AKE was given by Bellare, Canetti and Krawczyk [32] . In 1999, Shoup proposed another security model for AKE protocols in the SIM-based setting [7] and informally compared his model with the one from [32] . In the same work, the author gave a sketch of a proof arguing that SIM-security against both static and adaptive adversaries is equivalent to the corresponding IND-security notions of [27] . Canetti and Krawczyk in [33] took SIM definitions further by expanding the composition guarantees of AKE from [7] to arbitrary protocols within the Universal Composability (UC) framework of Canetti [9] . Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE). The idea of PAKE has been first put forward by Bellovin and Meritt in [34] . Their proposal, the EKE protocol, was the first to show that it is possible to design a password authentication mechanism that can withstand offline dictionary attacks. The SPEKE protocol from Jablon [11] soon appeared, following a very different design strategy. However, both of these works included only informal security justifications. The first adequate security models for PAKE appeared in [4] and [6] around the same time. Both models were built upon already existing AKE models. Although the
Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we describe the Realor-Random model for PAKE due to Abdalla et al. [5] . Next, in Section 3, we introduce the simulation-based model for PAKE from Boyko et al. [6] . We assume some familiarity with the models and refer to the original publications for a full description. Section 4 examines the relation between the Real-Or-Random model of [5] and the simulation-based model of Boyko et al. [6] . Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 5.
The Real or Random Security Model for PAKE
The Real-or-Random (IND-RoR) security model for 2-party PAKE was introduced by Abdalla, Fouque and Pointcheval in [5] . In this section, we present an augmented version of the original model that allows us to explicitly incorporate the requirement of forward secrecy. Before we recall the IND-RoR model with forward secrecy, we introduce the notation that will used in the paper.
Notation
Let S be a set with cardinality |S|. We write s $ ← − S to denote sampling uniformly at random from S. The output of a probabilistic algorithm D on input x is denoted by y ← D(x), while y := D(x, r) denotes the (deterministic) output of an algorithm D on input x and fixed random coins r. Adversaries (respectively, challengers) will be denoted A (resp. C H ) in the IND-RoR model and B (resp. R M ) in the SIM model. The directory of passwords is pw, PPT stands for probabilistic polynomial-time and λ is the security parameter. A function f : N → R + is said to be negligible if it decreases faster than the inverse of any polynomial and the symbol negl designates some unspecified negligible function. We write A c ≡ B to denote two computationally indistinguishable distributions.
Description of the IND-RoR Model with Forward Secrecy
The so called IND-RoR model of Abdalla et al. [5] , defines security via a game played between a challenger C H and some adversary A whose goal is to distinguish real session keys from random strings. It follows from the Find-then-Guess (IND-FtG) model of [4] , however, the IND-RoR model allows A to ask multiple test queries to different instances while the IND-FtG restricts A to a single test query. This simple yet important change results in the IND-RoR model being strickly stronger than the IND-FtG model for PAKE. This is in contrast with the AKE scenario in which the two models are considered equivalent. Recall that in [4] , several variants of the IND-FtG model are described: these models can be differentiated depending on the type of forward secrecy they are trying to capture. Nevertheless, the original IND-RoR model from [5] does not include a forward secrecy requirement. In this section, we present an augmented version 6 of the original IND-RoR model to incorporate forward secrecy by following [42, 4] , which we will simply refer as FS-IND-RoR to differentiate from the original IND-RoR model. PROTOCOL PARTICIPANTS. Each participant in a two party PAKE protocol is either a client C ∈ C or a server S. Let U = C S denote the set of all (honest) participants. Additionally, each initialized participant U is associated with a unique identifier id U . During the execution of the protocol, there might be several running instances of each participant. A running instance i of some participant U ∈ U is called an oracle instance and is denoted by Π i U . LONG-TERM SECRETS. Server S holds a password π for each client C, i.e. it holds a vector L =< π i > i∈C . In the opposite direction, client C shares a single password π with server S. For simplicity let π also denote the function assigning passwords to pair of users. We will refer to π[id C , id S ] as the password shared between client C and server S.
is not allowed in the model. The passwords are assumed to be independent and uniformly distributed.
PROTOCOL EXECUTION. Protocol P is an algorithm that describes how participants behave in response to inputs from their environment. Each participant can run P in parallel with different partners, which is modeled by allowing an unlimited number of instances of each participant to be created. We assume the presence of an adversary A who has full control over the network i.e. she entirely controls the communication between legitimate entities. She can enumerate, offline, the words of the password directory pw. SECURITY EXPERIMENT IN FS-IND-ROR MODEL. Security in the IND-RoR model with forward secrecy is defined via a game played between the challenger C H and adversary A. At the beginning of the experiment, C H tosses a coin and sets b ∈ {0, 1} outside of A's view. Then A is given access to i) endless supply of user instances Π i U and ii) oracle queries to control them. Oracle queries are answered by the corresponding Π i U according to P. A's goal is to find out the value of the hidden bit b. Next, we summarize the oracle queries A can access during the security experiment.
-Initialize user(U, id U , role U ). A assigns the string id U as identity and role U ∈ {client, server} to user U ∈ U, subject to the restriction that id U has not been already assigned to another user. There are two cases:
• If role U = server we simply write S instead of U. Then, for every initialized client C ∈ C with id C , a password is picked uniformly at random from the dictionary pw and assigned to the corresponding pair of client-
• In case role U = client we shall simply write C instead of U. Then, provided that S has already been initialized with
user U ∈ U is created and denoted by Π i U . It is assigned i) a role role i U ∈ {open, connect} and ii) a partner identity pid i U corresponding to the identity of some user U that Π i U is supposed to communicate with in the future. The following constraint must hold:
• role U and role U are complementary, i.e. role U = server and role U = client or the other way around. User instances are modeled as state machines with implicit access to the protocol description P and its corresponding password, i.e. some Π i U with pid i U = id U is given access to π[U, pid i U ].
-Send (U, i, m). A sends message m to user instance Π i U . The latter behaves according to the protocol description, sends back the response m to A (if any) and updates its state as follows:
• continue: Π i U is ready to receive another message.
• reject: Π i U aborts the protocol execution and sets the session key sk i U =⊥. This can be due to receiving an unexpected message m.
• accept: Π i U holds pid i U , session identifier sid i U and sk i U . However, Π i U still expects to receive another message to fulfill the protocol specification.
• terminate: Π i U holds pid i U , sid i U and sk i U . It has completed the protocol execution and will not send nor receive any other message.
-Execute (U, i,U , j). The transcript of the execution is returned to A. It models honest execution of the protocol between Π i U and Π j U .
-Corrupt(U). A learns the long-term secret information of some initialized user U.
A asks for the session key of user instance Π i U . Provided that status i U = terminate, C H responds as follows 7 :
• If there was a Corrupt (U * ) query -where U * can be any user-and a Send query directed to Π i U before the sk is computed, then A gets the real sk of Π i U . Otherwise:
• C H responds using the bit b. If b = 1 then A gets the real sk of Π i U , if b = 0 she gets a random string r $ ← − {0, 1} l sk , where l sk denotes the length of session keys. To ensure consistency, whenever b = 0 the same random string is returned for test queries asked to two partnered instances.
Matching Instances. Two instances, Π i U and Π j U , are matching instances if: Advantage of the adversary. During the experiment, A is allowed to ask several test queries directed to different oracle instances Π i U in the terminate state. All these queries are answered depending on the bit b chosen at the beginning of the experiment with either the real session key if b = 1 or a random string otherwise.
At the end of the game, A outputs a bit b and wins the game if b = b, i.e. if she distinguished real session keys from random strings. The advantage of A in the FS-IND-RoR security game for protocol P and passwords sampled uniformly at random from dictionary pw is defined as follows:
(1) 
where n is an upper bound on the number of sessions initialized by A and λ is the security parameter.
Remark 1. As we mentioned before, different flavors of forward secrecy exist in the literature, e.g. just in [4] the authors provide three particular definitions which could either weaken or strengthen the security guaranteed by the model in case of compromise of long term secret information. While the intuition of forward secrecy and the security guarantee that it aims to provide are understood, it is unclear which definition of forward secrecy is de facto the right one for PAKE protocols. Therefore, to be explicit, we consider forward secrecy in the weak corruption model described in [4] , where corruption of some principal leaks only its password to the adversary, i.e. no internal state is revealed.
In the Client-Server setting, it is reasonable to assume that compromise of the server leaks the whole password data file to the adversary, even for asymmetric PAKEs. Thus, the model pessimistically renders every instance, whose session key was negotiated after someone got corrupted, as compromised and no security is guaranteed. Such a case is formalized in the Test query, which is answered with the real session key, i.e. independently of the bit b, whenever the previously mentioned scenario occurs. We note that it is possible to fine-tune the model by distinguishing compromise of a server from a client's one, however, it will place new cumbersome conditions to the Test query making the analysis more complex and without gaining some significant improvement.
Remark 2. When using passwords as means of authentication, there is a nonnegligible probability of an adversary successfully impersonating an honest user by simply guessing its password. This problem is unavoidable and inherent to PAKE protocols. Consequently, the security definition considers a PAKE protocol to be secure if only on-line dictionary attacks are possible i.e. the protocol should not leak any information that allows the adversary to obtain the password in an off-line manner.
Security in the Simulation Mode with Forward Secrecy
SIM-based security requires the definition of two scenarios: i) an Ideal World (IW ) which describes the key exchange service that is meant to be provided and ii) a Real World (RW ) to describe the real interaction between honest protocol participants and an adversary attacking the protocol. The IW is designed in such a way that it is secure by definition and follows the desired security properties that a PAKE should satisfy. When dealing with passwords as long-term secret information for authentication, the security model has to acknowledge the non-negligible probability of an adversary guessing the correct password and successfully impersonating an honest user. There are two ways to incorporate this defect due to the low entropy of passwords in the SIM-based security model; the first approach is considered in [6, 8] while the second in [25, 43] : 1. Incorporate the non-negligible probability of an adversary guessing the password into the ideal world, by explicitly allowing the ideal world adversary to verify the guess of a candidate password. Then one defines a protocol to be secure if the real-world execution is computationally indistinguishable from an execution in the ideal world. 2. Do not allow password guessing in the ideal world but relax the requirement of indistinguishability between the real world and ideal world transcripts. One defines a protocol to be secure as one whose real-world execution is distinguishable from an execution in the ideal world with probability at most n/|pw| + negl(λ), where n is the number of active user instances and pw is the dictionary. Keep in mind that we make use of this approach in Section 4 when we prove Theorem 3.
For now we consider only the first approach. We augment the original SIM-BMP model of Boyko et al. [6] to account for scenarios where forward secrecy is required. For clarity, we refer to the later simulation model with forward secrecy as FS-SIM-BMP to distinguish from the original one. The inclusion of this security property in the SIM-BMP model allows us to provide a fair comparison to the IND-RoR model with forward secrecy as described in Section 2, otherwise, the models would be incomparable simply because they aim for different security guarantees. We consider forward secrecy in the weak corruption model as described in [4, 7] for this task.
Ideal World
The ideal world (IW ) model describes the service that a PAKE aims to provide, i.e. to allow parties to jointly compute a high entropy secret session key, which can be used later in higher level applications. In the IW there are no messages flowing around the network nor cryptography. The session keys are chosen at random by a trusted party and delivered out-of-band to the honest users. 
LONG-TERM SECRETS:
The FS-SIM-BMP model does not make any assumption on the password distribution. However, to allow a fair comparison to the FS-IND-RoR model, we assume the passwords to be independent and uniformly distributed.
PROTOCOL EXECUTION: There is no protocol execution in the ideal world.
The session key of an instance is generated by the R M * when B * asks that instance the start session query. Additionally B * is given access to the following oracles:
-Initialize user(U, id U , role U ). Identical to that in the FS-IND-RoR model.
[Transcript:("init. user",U, role U )] -Initialize user instance(U, i, role i U , pid i U ). Identical to that in the FS-IND-RoR model.
-Abort user instance (U, i) Adversary B * asks R M * to abort user instance Π i U . We say then that Π i U is aborted. [Transcript: ("abort. user inst.",U, i)] 8 Note that the original SIM-BMP model [6] also places role i U in the transcript, but we have chosen to remove it. This is because in the ideal world, from two partnered instances, the one with the role "open" will always start session first. On the other hand, in the real world, the adversary is free to choose which instance is assigned role "open" and which "connect". Thus, a real world adversary could make an honest execution of a protocol between an instance with role "connect" that terminates first, and an instance with role "open" that terminates second. Such a transcript, which constitutes an honest execution of a protocol, would not be simulatable in the ideal world if the roles "open" and "connect" are placed in the transcript.
-Test instance password (U, i, π ). For user instance Π i U and password guess π , B * queries if π equals π(U, pid i U ). If this is true, the query is called successful guess on {U, pid i U }. This query can be asked only once per user instance. The user instance must be initialized and not yet engaged in a session, i.e. no start session operation has been performed for that instance. Note that B * is allowed to ask a test instance password query to an instance that is aborted. This query does not leave any records in the transcript.
-Corrupt (U). B * learns the long-term secret information of some initialized user U. If role U = client, then B * gets π U . Otherwise, if role U = server, then B * receives L =< π i > i∈C .
[Transcript: ("Corrupt",U, π U )]
-Start session(U, i). B * specifies that a session key for user instance Π i U must be generated, by specifying one of the three connection assigments available:
• open for connection from (U , j). This operation is allowed if: c1) • expose (U, i, sk). B * assigns session key sk of his choice to user instance Π i U . This connection assignment is allowed if at least one of the following conditions hold: i) there has been a successful test instance password on Π i U or ii) there was a Corrupt query, directed to any user, before the start session operation.
[Transcript: ("start session",U, i)] -Application ( f ,U, i). The adversary specifies an efficiently computable function f and a user instance Π i U for which a session key sk i U has already been established. It gets back f ({sk i U }, R), where R is a global random bit string which user instances are given access to. R is not correlated to the established session keys and usually is referred to as the environment.
-Implementation. This is a do nothing operation. B * is allowed to place implementation operations without taking any effect in the ideal world. It is needed to allow B * to construct transcripts that are equivalent to those in the real world.
[Transcript: ("impl", cmmt)]
Transcript. Some of the previously mentioned queries are recorded in a transcript. Let IW T * denote the transcript generated by B * .
Remark 3. The SIM-BMP model handles on-line dictionary attacks, which are unavoidable and inherent to PAKEs, by introducing the notion of passwords and specifically the test instance password query in the ideal world definition. This approach places the fundamental requirement that an active adversary can test at most one password per protocol execution. In fact, provided that the PAKE in question should be deemed SIM-BMP secure, the test instance password allows the simulator to create ideal world transcripts which are computationally indistinguishable from real world ones. In a more general sense, the expose connection assignment is allowed whenever the adversary could compute by his own the session key shared with some instance Π i U , e.g. a successful online dictionary attack or a Corrupt query asked before the connection assignment. This is similar to the freshness condition defined for IND-based models, which prevents the adversary from winning the experiment by trivial means.
The purpose of running PAKE protocol is to later use the established session keys in higher-level application protocols, e.g. the construction of secure communication channels is their most natural application. However, partial information about the established session key could potentially be leaked to the adversary through the usage of such keys, e.g. cryptanalysis, side channel attacks, etc. The application query models the ability of the adversary to get any information she wishes about the environment and the established session keys. The function f is defined by B * , the only constraint is that it must be efficiently computable. . Additionally, the following record is added to the transcript depending on state i U . If state i U = "terminate" add ("start session",U, i). If state i U = "abort" add ("abort",U, i). -Corrupt (U). The same as in IW .
Real World
[Transcript: ("Corrupt",U, π U )] -Application ( f ,U, i). The same as in IW .
[Transcript:
Transcript. Let RW T be the transcript generated by B. This is a sequence of records describing the actions of B when interacting with the real world protocol. R M generates B's random tape and places it in the first record of the transcript.
[Transcript: ("impl", "random tape", rt)]. 
Relations between FS-IND-RoR and FS-SIM-BMP
In this section, we establish the relations between FS-IND-RoR and FS-SIM-BMP security models for PAKEs. The results obtained follow from earlier conference paper [10] . The difference is that in the present work the considered security models incorporate the notion of forward secrecy as security requirement. We start by showing that FS-SIM-BMP security implies FS-IND-RoR security. For clarity the proof is divided in two parts which we summarize here:
1. First we build a real-world adversary B A from A. The motivation is to generate a real-world transcript RW T according to the FS-SIM-BMP model but following A's commands. Additionally, since P is FS-SIM-BMP secure, the simulatability definition guarantees the existence of an ideal-world transcript IW T * that is computationally indistinguishable from the RW T . Additionally, we show that one can use the previously generated RW T to instantiate again
A and obtain identical executions of the previously simulated experiment to A. The same reasoning applies when initializing A according to IW T * . 2. We build a distinguisher D A using A as a subroutine, whose goal is to tell apart RW T from IW T * transcripts. The distinguisher looks at whether A wins his security challenge when initialized with the given transcript. From this, we can bound the advantage of A in the FS-IND-RoR experiment to at most n/|pw| + negl(λ). Concrete details of Part 1 and Part 2 follow: Part 1. We construct B A using an A as a subroutine, where B A uses his own R M to answer A's queries. B A can perfectly simulate the FS-IND-RoR experiment to A (see Table 1 ). The objective is to generate a transcript RW T from the interaction R M vs B A . The resulting transcript will be used in the second part of the proof. We detail the construction of B A , however, a reader familiar with FS-SIM-BMP and FS-IND-RoR security models could simply go to U , however, if b = 0, then B A generates a random string r ← {0, 1} l sk and gives it to A. In order to avoid strategies where A could trivially win the game, whenever b = 0 the same r is returned for test queries asked to two partnered instances 9 .
-The experiment continues and A is allowed to make more queries as she wishes. Eventually, A outputs her guess b and the FS-IND-RoR game finishes.
-B A makes an application query and writes in the transcript the string "b, rt A ".
For the sake of the proof, it is not necessary to write the bit b in the transcript.
The real-world transcript created is RW T . Furthermore, the FS-SIM-BMP definition guarantees the existence of a corresponding ideal-world transcript IW T * , i.e. ∀B ∃B * such that RW T c ≡ IW T * .
Remark 4. Given either RW T or IW T * , it is possible create instances of A as needed, simulate to A the FS-IND-RoR experiment and obtain identical executions as recorded in the corresponding transcript. The reason is that A can be initialized with random tape rt A contained in the transcript, and then A's behavior is deterministic and known in advance -given the corresponding transcript -. Rewinding the adversary to a specific state is a standard proof technique [44] .
However, our requirement is simpler since we only need to initialize and run A from the beginning. Assume for now we are in experiment G 1 and consider how the keys in IW T * were generated. Let γ be the event that at least one sk is generated via expose connection assignment as a result of a test instance password query that occurs during the execution of B * interacting with R M * , i.e. a successful online dictionary attack. Let β be the complement of γ, i.e. the event that no successful password guess occurred during the interaction of B * and R M * .
Claim 1 Pr(γ) ≤ n/|pw|. 10
Proof. For a single user instance, by definition of the ideal world, the probability of a successful password guess by B * is 1/|pw|. We apply the union bound, and get that if there are at most n instances, Pr(γ) ≤ n/|pw|.
Proof. Given than β occurs, the session keys placed in IW T * were generated either by i) expose connection assignment -provided that there was a Corrupt query before the connection assignment-or ii) open or connect connection assignment. Then, whenever A makes a Test query to an instance whose session key was generated via case i), the simulator answers with the real sk computed at the tested instance, i.e. the answer is independent of the bit b by definition of the FS-IND-RoR experiment. Similarly, whenever A makes a Test query to an instance whose session key was generated via case ii), the simulator answers with a random string independent of the bit b. Therefore, the view of A is independent of the hidden bit b so Pr(b = b | β) = 1/2.
Using Claim 1 and Claim 2 we get:
Equation 4 expresses the observation that, by construction of the ideal-world, an adversary cannot do better than online dictionary attacks.
Now, we build a PPT algorithm D A whose aim is to distinguish real-word from ideal-world transcripts. D A gets as input a transcript t ∈ {RW T, IW T * }, and uses it to initialize a PPT adversary A and simulate a FS-IND-RoR experiment to A. The simulation will be either G 0 or G 1 . If SIM-security holds, then D A cannot distinguish real world and ideal world transcripts, and so A cannot win his FS-IND-RoR experiment with advantage greater than n/|pw| + negl(λ).
In more details, on input some transcript t, D A proceeds as follows:
-Look for the last record of the transcript containing the string "b, rt A ".
-D "simulates" the challenger in the FS-IND-RoR experiment and initializes A on random tape rt A . Since A is given rt A , she behaves (deterministic) the same way as recorded in the transcript t. Every query asked by A can be answered by D by just reading t. and
From Equation 3 of FS-SIM-BMP security we know the following holds:
Then it holds that |Pr
. By definition of G 0 and G 1 :
The term Pr [ A wins | t = RW T ] is actually the probability of A winning on a perfectly simulated FS-IND-RoR experiment. We combine with Equation 4 and get:
We obtain that, if FS-SIM-BMP-security holds, then ∀ PPT A Adv FS−RoR P,pw (A) ≤ n/|pw| + negl(λ), proving that FS-SIM-BMP ⇒ FS-IND-RoR. Now we investigate the reverse, i.e. whether FS-IND-RoR security also implies FS-SIM-BMP security. We obtain the following result: 
where ω is non-negligible term. Looking at the definition of the real and ideal-world transcripts, we conclude that whenever b = 1 the transcript generated is real-world while if b = 0 the transcript is ideal world. The reason is that in the real-world, the user instances compute their sk's according to the description of the protocol and only such computed sk's are placed transcript. However, in the ideal-world, the session keys placed in the transcript are i) random strings provided that freshness condition is satisfied or ii) no restriction about sk provided that freshness is not satisfied, i.e. the simulator is given the freedom to specify the session key as he wishes.
Let D be the PPT distinguisher whose existence is guaranteed by the negation of FS-SIM-BMP security. 11 
where ω is a non-negligible function.
Unfortunately, Theorem 2 is not enough to prove that FS-IND-RoR security implies FS-SIM-BMP security. The reason is that the total number of instances initialized by our construction of A is n A + n B , where n A is the number of explicit password guesses of subroutine A 1 and n B is the number of instances initialized while subroutine A B 2 is simulating the real world ring master to B. Therefore, proving by contradiction that FS-IND-RoR ⇒ FS-SIM-BMP would require Adv FS−RoR P,pw (A) > (n A + n B )/pw + ω. We recall from Section 3 that there are two ways to take account of online dictionary attacks in SIM-based security models for PAKEs:
1. Include a test instance password query in IW and require computational indistinguishability of RW T and IW T * . 2. Do not include a test instance password in IW but allow a non-negligible bound on the distinguishability of RW T and IW T * . The SIM-based model Boyko, MacKenzie and Patel [6] follows the first style. We modify it so it follows the second style. We call the modified model FS-SIM-BMP'. The only changes are the following:
1. Remove the test instance password query from IW in FS-SIM-BMP. 2. Relax the requirement of indistinguishability between real and ideal world.
FS-SIM-BMP' security. Protocol P is FS-SIM-BMP' secure if it satisfies completeness and additionally for all Real World adversaries B, there exits an Ideal World adversary B * such that for all distinguishers D:
where n is an upper bound on the number of sessions initialized by B.
Next, we show that FS-IND-RoR security implies FS-SIM-BMP' security. Proof. This is a proof by contradiction and the strategy is similar to the one employed in Theorem 2.
We assume that FS-SIM-BMP' security does not hold. Then ∃B ∀B * ∃D s.t.:
where n is an upper bound on the number of sessions initialized and ω is a nonnegligible function. Using the same analysis as in the proof of Theorem 2, we get: but ω is not negligible, a contradiction. Now, we investigate the reverse, i.e. whether FS-SIM-BMP' security implies FS-IND-RoR security. We obtain the following result:
